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PANEL I (PART 2): DISCUSSION 
TRANSCRIPT 
PROFESSOR BAIR:  I enjoyed reading both of these papers 
very much.  I think Jerry [Markham]’s paper explicitly and 
Heidi [Schooner]’s paper implicitly buttress the case for a need 
for revamping our current system of functional regulation with 
its multiplicity of regulators. 
That certainly has been the conclusion that I’ve come to after 
20 years working in Washington, as Professor Poser pointed 
out, both on the futures side, the securities side, and then 
Treasury, with dealing very closely with bank regulators, as 
well as insurance regulators.  I was the lead administration 
person on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Bill.  And something 
has got to give.  The current system is just not compatible, as it 
could be with financial innovation facilitating the growth of fi-
nancial supermarkets and the ability of financial institutions to 
provide the kinds of financial services their customers want, 
unfettered by artificial lines demarcating whether it’s a future 
or security or bank product or what have you. 
I think from a practical level, from the regulator’s perspec-
tive, I think the current system increasingly produces very re-
source-straining turf fights.  Jerry [Markham] catalogued the 
battles with the SEC and the CFEC, some of which I was per-
sonally involved in over the years.  I used to think that regula-
tory competition was a healthy thing in terms of providing, pro-
ducing greater efficiencies with regulation.  I’m less convinced 
that there really is that much benefit from regulatory competi-
tion, because I think the turf fights are quite resource draining.  
I think OTC derivatives, swap market is a prime example 
where the debate really over the years has been dominated by 
who should be regulated, not whether or how they should be 
regulated.  And we still don’t really have a coherent regulatory 
policy towards OTC derivatives. 
The system also currently does not work for multifaceted fi-
nancial services firms.  It’s just not conducive.  I’m not going to 
get into the charting wars that Howell [Jackson] and Jerry 
[Markham] both in their papers and presentations; they have 
catalogued all the different regulators.  There are hundreds of 
them out there that you have to deal with if you’re offering a 
full product line of financial services. 
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So there’s just got to be a better way to build the mousetrap.  
I think it’s going to be a very long process, unless there’s some 
major, major crisis — you know, Enron tenfold — that would 
really precipitate a major revamping of the financial services 
regulatory structure, I think this is going to be a very long, 
drawn-out process, along the lines of the Glass-Steagall ten-to-
fifteen-year process.  But, nonetheless, it needs to be done and 
must be done if we are going to maintain our international 
competitive position. 
Let me just briefly provide a few specific comments on the 
papers.  I would certainly agree with Heidi that any proposals 
to move us to a more integrated model that would involve tak-
ing the supervisory powers away from the Fed is just a non-
starter.  First of all, they’re not going to give it up.  Second of 
all, I’m not sure they should give it up.  I think it’s very difficult 
in a clean distinction between being a central bank and being a 
bank supervisor.  If you are a lender to your member institu-
tions you obviously want some ability to provide some financial 
integrity oversight of those member institutions.  More impor-
tantly, those institutions sufficiently large to propose systemic 
risk, I think you need some direct oversight and authority over 
those institutions.  So I would agree that taking supervisory 
authority away from the Fed and putting them in a new FSA 
type structure would not work in the United States. 
Similarly, putting it all, as Ireland has done, into the central 
bank, that’s a non-starter as well.  Again, I don't think the Fed 
would want that kind of supreme authority.  And, two, I think 
that’s just a really bad idea.  Though it’s not a perfect analog, if 
you look at the Ministry of Finance in Japan and the problems 
that that agency had when the Japanese economy hit the skids, 
they were totally incapable and I think still are, frankly, of 
showing flexibility and adaptability to deal with new economic 
changed circumstances.  So I think that’s a good — and, again, 
very well highlighted in Jerry’s paper — how concentration of 
too much power in a single regulator can be a very, very bad 
thing. 
Since we love our multiple regulators, let me just throw out a 
couple of ideas of how perhaps we could move to an integrated 
model but still have more than one regulator.  Heidi and I were 
talking about this a bit last night.  It was an idea we had kicked 
around at Treasury and I think we’re looking very, very long 
term.  But perhaps you could separate rule-making from super-
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visory function, so that you could have a single regulator for 
rule-making authority for the full financial services product 
line, but supervision would remain with the Fed.  If you just 
overlay it and let OCC and OTS and the Fed and what have you 
maintain the supervisory authority over their institutions.  But 
that would be one step, and I think that kind of builds on the 
coordinating council that the previous administration was try-
ing to move us toward.  But that might be a way where we could 
provide greater integration of financial services regulatory pol-
icy, but still not have a quite dramatic taking away of authority 
from a lot of pre-existing regulators. 
Another possibility I think is less desirable might be a possi-
bility would be to create a system of financially integrated su-
pervision and regulation, but separated out according to institu-
tion size. It would give the Fed, they could be both the regulator 
and the supervisor for the very largest financial services com-
pany.  You could maybe create a new agency with or without 
the FDIC — I’d have to think about that — for the smaller in-
stitutions.  At least then . . . you wouldn’t have one agency and 
completely in charge of everything.  You would have two agen-
cies which presumably would compete.  But their responsibili-
ties would be separated on kind of clean “how big is the institu-
tion” as opposed to whether you’re doing securities or futures or 
banking or what have you. 
An integrated model, though, in addition to Fed resistance, 
obviously if you have full integration, the question is what do 
you do with the securities and futures regulators, because pre-
sumably you would fold their function into the new integrated 
regulator.  And I can only assume the SEC and the CFTC would 
be quite unhappy about that.  And I think that is another real, 
very real issue that needs to be thought about.  I mean, 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, as Heidi [Schooner] outlined in her pres-
entation, theoretically the Fed is the regulator for financial 
holding companies.  But they basically have no authority to go 
in and oversee a securities firm.  They must defer to the SEC on 
that.  Or a futures firm, they must defer to the CFTC.  Or a na-
tional bank the OCC, or a thrift, the OTS. 
I mean, those kinds of balkanized lines were still maintained 
under Gramm-Leach-Bliley.  So I think going to a truly inte-
grated model where you would fold the SEC and CFTC, those 
types of functions into an integrated regulator would be a quite 
dramatic thing to happen, perhaps a good thing to happen in 
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the long term.  But I think there would be a lot of political resis-
tance to that. 
That brings me to Jerry’s paper.  Unfortunately, he didn’t get 
to it at the end, but he had some very interesting new para-
digms.  If we were going to scrap the current functional lines of 
securities and futures, he had some very interesting ideas for 
how we might reorganize the categories that we use to define 
the regulatory regime.  And those were centered in large part 
along the sophistication of the institutions, their size, whether 
they were going only institution by institution or whether they 
were dealing with retail cost customers.  Similarly for market 
regulation, whether they were institutional markets or public 
markets with retail small investor access.  I agree with him, I 
think, if we were going to be designing a grand scheme, either 
the short term or long term, that those kinds of distinctions 
may make more sense than the current lines that we use.  I 
would just have a few caveats.  I’m not sure I would go quite as 
far as he would.  I think that regardless of what market or what 
association you’re regulating, no matter their size or sophistica-
tion — it’s not going to surprise him to hear me say this — I 
think you always need anti-fraud and anti-manipulation au-
thority. 
Fraud is fraud, and you never want to be in a position where 
the institution that you’re regulating has committed fraud and 
you’ve got to say you can't do anything about it. 
I think that they’re all — and Arthur Andersen comes to 
mind when I say this — I think there are certain types of fraud 
that perhaps can be handled better in a civil capacity through 
administrative regulatory proceedings and civil proceedings as 
opposed to the neutron bomb of the criminal proceeding.  There 
are just situations where fraud works — civil courts and admin-
istrative regulatory agencies are better equipped to deal with 
certain types of cases.  So I think whatever regime must always 
retain that civil anti-fraud authority. 
Similarly, anti-manipulation.  If you have markets that are 
setting prices that are relied upon by the general populace, even 
if those markets are dominated by institutions, I think regula-
tors must retain that anti-manipulation authority.  And finally, 
I also think that somebody — and again maybe this long-term 
needs to be the Fed — some federal financial regulator needs to 
be in charge of financial integrity oversight over institutions 
that are sufficiently large to pose systemic risk. 
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Let me just, in concluding, re-emphasize that I think this is 
going to be a very, very long-term process.  I mean, we dealt 
with it at Treasury.  Howell indicated the difficulties they had 
with just a very modest proposal of a coordinating council.  And 
unless there’s some industry political support for moving this 
ball forward — it’s good policy — we talk about what good pol-
icy is, but unless there’s some political push for it, it’s not going 
to happen on the Hill. 
I think some of the larger financial services firms are now 
getting into the fray with this and realize that it is in their 
business interest, in their competitive interest to push this for-
ward, to work with the Treasury Department and others who 
have an interest in this, to move the ball forward in terms of 
regulatory restructuring. 
I think there’s some interim steps that can be taken.  And I 
will say this now.  I couldn’t say it when I was at the Treasury 
Department, but now I’m in academia and I have no power to 
do anything about it.  So I will say it and nobody will care any-
more.  But I do think the OCC and OTS should be merged.  And 
I say that with the utmost respect for the leadership of both 
agencies.  Jerry Hoff and Jim Gilling are top-notch regulators 
and their staffs are just absolutely the best.  Unfortunately, 
because of bank consolidations, the number of charters is dwin-
dling.  Their revenue basis is becoming increasingly reliant on a 
few large institutions.  This is a very dangerous situation for 
maintaining an autonomous independent regulator.  I think by 
merging the two you would strengthen the agency, strengthen 
the prestige of the agency, strengthen its ability to deal with the 
institutions that hold national charters, whether thrift or bank. 
I think this is a harder call, but I think the SEC and CFTC 
should probably be merged.  Unlike the OCC and the OTS, 
which have very similar cultures and missions in terms of 
safety and soundness, the SEC and the CFTC have quite differ-
ent cultures and different product lines and markets. . . .  I’m 
old fashioned.  I still recognize distinctions between risk man-
agement products and those offered for capital formation and 
investment.  Nonetheless, I think there’s sufficient overlap, es-
pecially with the institutions, the firms that they regulate, that 
it makes some sense to merge them. 
I would say that with the SEC and CFTC the most important 
thing would be to make sure the CFTC is not simply subsumed 
in the SEC culture, but maintains its own separate approach 
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where it is needed, and separate vibrancy in whatever new 
commission might be created out of the merger and that that 
commission had individuals who understood derivatives mar-
kets and were sensitive to the different type of regulatory re-
gime that currently applies to derivative markets. 
I also think we need to have a national insurance charter, 
frankly.  I think it should be optional, obviously.  But I think, 
again for international competitive reasons, it’s just going to 
have to happen.  And I think the sixty-four million dollar ques-
tion will be whether proponents of an optional national insur-
ance charter can present a convincing case that . . . the new 
federal regulator, will be just as vigilant on consumer protection 
issues as the states have been.  
I think the NAIC [National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners] is a top-notch agency.  I dealt with them a lot when 
I was dealing with terrorism insurance.  I think that is their 
front line of defense against a national insurance charter, is 
that it would hamper consumer protections.  I’m not sure that is 
the case.  I’m hoping to do some additional research in that area 
at U. Mass. [University of Massachusetts].  But I think a well 
constructed federal insurance charter with a good strong con-
sumer protection program is an option that should be out there 
for a national insurance company, and frankly consumers.  It’s 
not clear to me why somebody in Massachusetts should have 
different consumer protections than somebody in Florida for so 
many of these products.  The options should be out there for 
submission to a national regime. 
And that takes care of my comments. 
PROFESSOR POSER:  Thank you very much.  Ms. Bair. 
We have about ten minutes more.  I first would like to ask ei-
ther one of the two first speakers whether they have any com-
ments commenting on the commentary.  And then I’ll ask 
whether any members of the audience have any questions. 
PROFESSOR SCHOONER:  I would just add to what Sheila 
[Bair] already said.  I think what Sheila [Bair]’s comments 
show in some ways is that significant improvements could be 
made without doing something as drastic as what the U.K. did 
with creating the FSA.  We’ve got such a diverse system that 
moving a few things around could perhaps lead to significant 
benefits and maybe even cost savings.  And we could still, ar-
guably, if anybody believes that they exist, still have benefits of 
regulatory competition.  
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I think that in some ways it’s possible that beginning to un-
derstand the nature of the substance of the regulation and how 
the substance of our financial institution regulation is evolving 
might drive that.  Eventually we’ll figure out that bank regula-
tion is becoming a little bit more like securities markets regula-
tion, and therefore some aspects of bank regulation may belong 
more appropriately in an SEC type organization; that a lot of 
what we do with insurance companies is very much like what 
we do for banks; and that there might be some shifting slowly 
over time in that way without doing anything drastic, which is 
politically not feasible. 
PROFESSOR POSER:  Are there any questions from the au-
dience? 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  [Unintelligible]  
PROFESSOR MARKHAM:  Good question.  The futures in-
dustry belonged to America until recent years.  We dominated 
in every respect.  Today Eurex is the largest commodity trading 
exchange in the world.  I think our two exchanges are now third 
and fourth — I’m not sure, because of the LIFFE [London In-
ternational Futures and Options Exchange] merger, how that 
went.  But we’re trailing the pack.  Some people have attributed 
it to regulation.  I don't, personally.  I think they picked up on 
electronic trading and were able to out-compete us.  But by the 
back door, our regulatory system sought to protect the exchange 
monopoly.  So you had to trade on the exchange over here.  The 
exchange had this capital interest in the memberships, so they 
couldn’t allow anyone to trade electronically, because they’d lose 
the time and place advantage on the floor and that was the 
value of their membership.  So that regulatory structure I think 
is what affected and allowed that competition to develop while 
they’re hanging onto their exchange monopoly. 
And we saw that happen, and Sheila [Bair], you may know 
better.  I think the CFMA is probably a direct result of that out-
flow of that business.   We tried to deregulate as much as we 
could to meet that competition. 
MS. BAIR:  I think it would be interesting, though.  The SEC 
has been generally viewed as more regulatory than the CFTC 
on that score.  I think a merged agency would have been less 
captive of the exchanges and perhaps more willing to facilitate 
electronic competition and off-board trading. 
Of course, on the securities side we’ve had off-board trading 
for years and the exchanges and the OTC markets sit side by 
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side and they compete.  And it does work pretty well.  So I think 
on that score I would agree with you.  It wasn’t regulation.  It 
was an unwillingness to anticipate and deal with the competi-
tive threats to the exchanges. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  For any of the panelists, do 
you see any interest in more increased regulation of the over-
the-counter derivatives market or over-the-counter swaps mar-
ket?  To the extent they are engaged in by qualified partici-
pants, many of these other regulated industries are participat-
ing as counterparties in credit support providers.  
PROFESSOR MARKHAM:  The Feinstein Bill, I’ve heard, 
and I haven’t had an update on the last few weeks, was trying, I 
think, to reimpose some regulation in the over-the-counter mar-
ket. 
Will it get anywhere?  I don’t know.  This has been a political 
circus.  Something may spin out of it.  I don’t know.  There’s 
certainly an impetus for it. 
Is there something out there that we’ve got to worry about, 
something lurking in the bushes?  I don’t know.  Possibly.  But 
we’ve dealt with these problems over the years.  We keep crying 
that the world’s going to end if we don’t do something, but as 
yet it hasn’t.  Maybe I’m just an optimist, but I don’t have that 
fear of the unknown, I guess. 
PROFESSOR SCHOONER:  I think I have a little bit of a 
fear, but I don't think politically in the near term.  The genie’s 
somewhat out of the bottle on the swaps market, and to try to 
put any kind of comprehensive regulatory regime over at this 
point, I just don’t think it’s going to happen. 
I do think, hopefully, one of the good things to come out of all 
this corporate governance, new initiatives and heightened sen-
sitivities to the obligations of corporate boards of directors if 
they start asking more questions of end users who use these 
instruments: what is your exposure on these positions; why do 
they have these positions on; what’s the leverage; what kind of 
risk scenarios has the CFO run?  I mean, those types of probing 
questions from audit committees and boards of directors [are] 
probably the quickest and fastest way that we can put greater 
discipline into the types of positions and risks that less sophis-
ticated end users may be taking on in those markets. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  [Unintelligible]  
PROFESSOR MARKHAM:  I don’t know, sir.  I don’t know 
that.  I know there were Congressional hearings where they 
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brought in the Enron board and looked at the outside directors, 
but I have no information. 
PROFESSOR SCHOONER:  I served with Wendy [Graham] 
and I would have to take exception to that characterization of 
her position.  I’m unaware of any inquiry into her, what she did 
on the Enron board.  The press reports I’ve read have indicated 
that she had been the one saying we need go talk to the SEC 
about this.  Apparently, nobody acted on that. 
Wendy [Graham] is a free-market economist by training.  But 
she did believe in efficient regulation.  And that was certainly 
my experience working with her.  I think people have unfairly 
characterized her as anti any regulation.  I don’t think that’s 
the case.  I think she was for good cost benefit analysis and effi-
cient regulation, but not no regulation. 
PROFESSOR POSER:  In Wendy Graham’s defense, I’d have 
to say that none of the other directors did any more than she 
did. 
Any other questions?  Okay.  I believe lunch is being served 
downstairs.   
 
